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ABSTRACT C Recently the United States and a number of its traditional allies have clashed over a 
variety of foreign policy issues that are profoundly juridical: the authority for war and peace, the 
International Criminal Court, etc.  The source of these recent tensions is to be located at a level 
deeper than that of narrow national interests and specific policies.  Rather, they arise from 
significant differences concerning the nature of Aconsensus@ and, ultimately, legal philosophy. While 
the United Nations and many other international organizations derive their legal visions from the 
philosophy of law of Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), one of the most important jurists of the twentieth 
century.  Although Kelsen=s Apure theory of law@ has long been the focus of legal scholars around the 
world, and despite the fact that he spent the last three decades of his life teaching in the United 
States, he is generally ignored in American jurisprudence C a state of affairs that goes a long way to 
explaining the lack of appreciation in U.S. policy circles of the deeply-rooted nature of the attitudes 
that confront the country=s foreign policy.
This study analyzes Kelsen=s legal philosophy in the light of its application to international law and 
organizations, both in theory and in actual practice, and confronts it with U.S. interests.  In 
particular, Kelsen=s assertion of the primacy of the international legal system over the national legal 
systems and his argument that the latter derive their validity from the former are subject to scrutiny 
in the light of recent developments at the UN and with international criminal jurisdictions.  
Regardless of one=s position on these matters, a Adecent respect for the opinions of mankind,@ to 
borrow the felicitous phrase of the Founding Fathers, will require an effort to recognize and 
understand C although not necessarily  to agree with C Kelsen=s philosophy of law and its 
significance as the legal philosophy that motivates the insistence of international organizations, like 
the United Nations, as well as other countries on Aconsensus@ and their drive for a system of global 
governance that will impact not only states, but also civil society institutions as well.
2Most Americans, even those who usually consider themselves seasoned political observers, 
were surprised at the vehemence with which, during the debates preceding AOperation Iraqi 
Freedom,@ many at the United Nations and other international assizes not only opposed the specific 
policies of President George W. Bush and his administration, but also contested the very notion that 
the United States government could be permitted to stake a position that was Aunilateral,@ that is, 
different from the Aconsensus@ of the world body.  Even prescinding from the specific case of the 
military intervention in Iraq by the armed forces of the United States and its allies, many at the 
United Nations and the various non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that, together with the UN 
and its bureaucracy, pass nowadays as the institutional incarnation of the Ainternational community@
have excoriated the United States in recent years for its Aunilateralism@ in refusing to defer to the 
Amultilateral@ international Aconsensus@ on such matters as the Kyoto Protocol on environmental 
change (1996), the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel land mines (1998), and the Rome Statute 
creating the International Criminal Court (1999).  
There are a number of different explanations proposed for these tensions, each with its own 
suggested remedy.  According to one school of thought, tensions and even heated exchanges have 
been and are part and parcel of international diplomacy.  Hence, the exponents of this explanation 
counsel to do nothing: allow time to pass and tempers to cool, recognizing that, as one former U.S. 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Charles W. Freeman, Jr., has observed on another occasion, 
Aestrangement from former friends invites charges of perfidy, but a state=s bargaining power is 
usually enhanced, rather than impaired, by demonstrating its freedom of diplomatic maneuver in 
3pursuit of national interests.@1
A variant of this approach is the temptation to write off this criticism C especially in light of 
the French government=s recent volte-face from promising to veto any UN Security Council 
resolution authorizing the use of force in Iraq to demanding for French firms a share in the lucrative 
post-war reconstruction contracts being awarded by the Coalition Provisional Authority installed by 
the victors C as a momentary tempest in a teapot, fueled by the puerile feelings of impotence in the 
face of the world=s lone hyperpuissance (to recall former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine=s 
less-than-affectionate designation for an America he viewed as too worryingly powerful to be 
1 CHARLES W. FREEMAN, JR., Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy (Washington: United States Institute of 
Peace Press, 1997), 82.
4designated a mere Asuperpower@).2
2
 For an incisive and convincing analysis of the instinctive opposition to the United States on the part of the 
European, especially French, governing elites, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL, L=obsession anti-américaine. Son 
fonctionnement, ses causes, ses inconséquences (Paris: Plon, 2002).  Ravel, a member of the Académie française, is 
unsparing in his criticism of his peers, arguing that: AIt is lies coming from an anti-American bias that have invented 
American unilateralism.  Tendentious blindness and systematic hostility on the part of many of the governments towards 
America have weakened them and keep them from an understanding of realities.  It is these governments themselves 
that...by substituting action with animosity and analysis with passion, have condemned themselves to impotence and, as a 
result, nourished the American superpower@ (300). 
5Other observers have sought to attribute these tensions to what they perceive is a lack of 
leadership and effectiveness in American participation at the United Nations and other multilateral 
bodies.  Such was the conclusion of a blue-ribbon bi-partisan task force co-sponsored by the Council 
on Foreign Relations and Freedom House and co-chaired by Congressman David Dreier and former 
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton.3  The recommendations of the task force for tactical and institutional 
reforms of the U.S. missions to the United Nations and other international organizations were 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Congressman Dreier and Congressman Tom Lantos 
under the form of bill, H.R. 1590, the AUnited States International Leadership Act of 2003.@
Such approaches to the current tensions, while completely justified in se, suffer nonetheless 
from their failure to take into account the long-term significance C not only to the policy interests of 
the United States, but for the international system itself C of raising Aconsensus@ to the status of a 
norm in international organizations like the United Nations.  What is at stake is not simply a question
of tactics and more effective public diplomacy.  What is ultimately behind the current tensions is a 
debate concerning legal philosophy, specifically about an ideology that underlies the entire juridical 
vision of the United Nations, to the detriment not only of the national interests of the United States 
of America, but also of the sovereignty of the nation-state and the democratic self-determination of 
smaller communities in an increasingly global world.  The examination of this philosophical vision 
3 LEE FEINSTEIN and ADRIAN KARATNYCKY (eds.), Enhancing U.S. Leadership at the United Nations: Report of 
an Independent Task Force Cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and Freedom House (New York: Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2002).
6C its intellectual origins, its current application, and the consequences thereof C is the purpose of the 
present study.
Two terms are essential to the understanding the actual terms of the present debate: consent
and consensus.  Both words derive from the Latin verb consentire (literally cum + sentire, Ato feel 
together,@ and, hence, Ato agree, to give permission@).  The notion behind the Latin verb was itself 
explored in even earlier antiquity, within the context of the Hellenic philosophical inquiry into the 
nature of freedom.  To the Stoics, who knew the concept in Greek as synkatathesis, it denoted a 
spiritual assent or accord to a proposition.  The modern use of the verb Ato consent@ (consentir in its 
Old French origins) dates at least back to the writings of Richard of St. Victor (ca. 1110-1173).4  In 
English, the use of the noun Aconsent@ to signify Aagreement@ or Apermission@ dates back to at least 
1225.  In its millennial usage, as both verb and noun, the word has implied an individual act wherein 
a truth proposed is affirmed. Thus the authors of the American Declaration of Independence held that 
Agovernments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed@
4
 On Richard of St. Victor=s use of Aconsent,@ see GERVAIS DUMEIGE, Richard de Saint-Victor et l=idée 
chrétienne de l=amour (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1952).  While Richard, the Scottish-born abbot of the 
Parisian Cistercian Abbey of Saint Victor, is best known for his writings in Christian spirituality, it was within the context 
of his development of a theology of the Trinity that he articulated an early psychology of consent; see RICHARD DE SAINT-
VICTOR, De Trinitate: Texte critique avec introduction, notes et tables, ed. JEAN RIBAILLIER, Textes philosophiques du 
Moyen Age 6 (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1958).  No less a figure than Dante characterized Richard=s thought 
on the matter as Ain contemplation more than human@ (Ache a considerar fu più che viro,@ Paradiso X, 130).    
7C that is, from the willful and explicit act of agreement of the governed to being ruled, an active act.
In contrast, apart from its technical use in the Latin of the medieval Church=s canon law, the 
now-much-used noun Aconsensus@ was relatively rare.  Its use in modern languages is of relatively 
recent coinage, being a product of the philosophical enlightenment and entering the English language 
only in the 19th century C specifically, in 1843, according to the second edition of the Oxford 
English Dictionary.  And while it derives from the same linguistic roots as its cousin Aconsent,@
consensus took on a slightly, but significantly, different nuance.  Rather than a truth affirmation, 
consensus occurs when, in the words of French philosopher Paul Foulquié, Aone gives to the decision 
that another initiated the personal adhesion necessary for it to pass into fulfillment.@5  That is, it is a 
passive acquiescence to an act that has no necessary correlation to objective truth.
This philosophical subtlety is crucial to understanding the indignation sparked by America=s
repudiation of what is presented as the Aconsensus@ of the world.  With the enlightenment thinkers, 
Immanuel Kant in particular, excluding considerations of the metaphysical from the public square, 
there emerged a paradox.  Democracy is based on the equality of all, on freedom of thought, speech, 
and association, giving rise to the Aconsent of the governed.@  However, when other first principles 
are excluded, democratic process becomes an absolute and majority rule risks causing a democrat 
society=s values to be determined a preponderance of voices that, for the sake of appearing legitimate, 
have to masquerade as an impersonal general will, or Aconsensus.@  Having no other point of 
5 AConsentement@ in PAUL FOULQUIÉ, Dictionnaire de la langue philosophique (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1962).
8reference other than a vote count of nation-states C and, increasingly, self-appointed NGOs C the 
UN and other international groups increasingly rely on Aconsensus@ to legitimize their deliberations.  
A classic illustration of this is the opprobrium heaped upon the United States for being in the 
Aextreme minority@ and defying Aconsensus@ in rejecting the Ottawa and Rome accords, when the 
majorities adopting both agreements consisted of states representing less than half of the world=s 
population.6  Thus the hypothetical Atyranny of the majority@ that Alexis de Toqueville cautioned 
against in Democracy in America has become real in the contemporary international community=s de 
facto Atyranny of consensus@ C and, often enough, the Aconsensus@ of a vocal minority at that.
6
 An excellent critical review of the role of a small group of states allied with globalist NGOs in formulating the 
international Aconsensus@ is found in DAVID DAVENPORT, AThe New Diplomacy,@ Policy Review 116 (December 
2002/January 2003): 17-30. 
9All of this comes by way of preface to the present situation in which the United States finds 
itself confronted regularly by an Ainternational community,@ as represented by the United Nations and 
those NGOs whose globalist agenda matches the ambitions of the UN bureaucracy to world 
governance, demanding that it give up its Aunilateral@ policies and submit to an alleged Amultilateral 
consensus.@7  This attitude, rather than being merely a reaction to the unique set of historical 
circumstances that left the United States, in the words of former President George H.W. Bush, the 
world=s Asole and preeminent power@ C with all the attendant resentment such a status inevitably 
brings C and, therefore, destined to dissolve once some future rival rises to balance America=s 
political, economic, and military might, represents a long-term ideological commitment inherent to 
the United Nations bureaucracy and the supranational legal system that is its goal to bring about, as 
UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan has candidly admitted:
Simply put, our post-war institutions were built for an inter-national world, but we 
now life in a global world.  Responding effectively to this shift is the core 
institutional challenge...More than ever, a robust international legal order, together 
with the principles and practices of multilateralism, is needed to define the ground 
7
 See the insightful inquiry in JOHN VAN OUDENAREN, AWhat is >Multilateral=?,@ Policy Review 117 
(February/March 2003): 33-47.
10
rules for an emerging global civilization.8
8 KOFI A. ANNAN, AWe the Peoples@: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century (New York: United 
Nations Information Office, 2000), 11, 13.
11
This drive to subsume national sovereignty within single Amultilateral consensus@ derives its 
theoretical foundations from the legal philosophy of Hans Kelsen, one of the most important jurists 
of the twentieth century, if not the most preeminent.9  Although Kelsen=s theory has long been the 
focus of legal scholars around the world, and despite the fact that he spent the last three decades of 
his life teaching in the United States, it is only recently that American scholars have begun to 
examine his thought10 C a state of affairs that goes a long way to explaining the lack of appreciation 
9 MICHAEL STEVEN GREEN, citing a number of legal scholars, qualified Kelsen as Athe most important legal 
theorist of the twentieth century.@  See AHans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems,@ Alabama Law Review 54 (2003): 
365-413.
10
 A very recent and noteworthy exception to this rule is the presence of an entire chapter, entitled AKelsen 
versus Hayek: Pragmatism, Economics, and Democracy,@ in RICHARD A. POSNER, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy
(Cambridge, Massachusetts/London: Harvard University Press, 2003), 250-291.  Even then, Judge Posner admits that he
12
in U.S. policy circles of the deeply-rooted nature of the hostile attitudes that confront the country=s 
independent international policy.
had never read Kelsen and knew nothing about him except his reputation as a Kantian and the title of his most famous 
book, Pure Theory of Law, until he was Acasting about for a suitable topic for a lecture that [he] had agreed to give at the 
annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, which was to be held in Vienna@ and being Atold that 
economic analysis of law hadn=t made much headway in Austria because the academic legal profession there remained 
under the sway of Austria=s (and Continental Europe=s) most distinguished twentieth-century legal philosopher, Hans 
Kelsen@ (250).
13
As not only is Kelsen relatively unknown in American circles, but the only complete 
biography of him to date, by his former student and assistant Rudolf Aladár Métall, was published in 
German11  and remains untranslated into English, it would be useful to rehearse the major events in 
the fascinating life of the legal scholar.12  Born in Prague on October 11, 1881, to a German-speaking 
Jewish family that moved shortly thereafter to Vienna, Kelsen pursued juridical studies even though 
his lifelong interests were in the humanistic disciplines of philosophy and literature C as some of his 
legal writings would show C and he had a passion for logic and mathematics as well as the natural 
sciences.  Although a convinced agnostic, he converted to Roman Catholicism in 1905, evidently to 
escape any problems of discrimination that his religious background might present to his ambitious 
designs for an academic career in the resolutely Catholic Austro-Hungarian empire.
In 1905, he published his first book, a study of the theory of the state in Dante.13  The 
following year, he received his doctorate in law from the University of Vienna.  In 1911, he qualified 
as a teacher of public law and of the philosophy of law with the publication of his first major work, a 
700-page study in which he first articulated his nascent legal theory.14  During the First World War, 
11 RUDOLF ALADÁR MÉTALL, Hans Kelsen, Leben und Werke. Eine autoriserte Biographie mit vollständigen 
Literatur und Schriftumverzeichnis (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1969).  A complete bibliography of Kelsen=s writings listed 
chronologically and thematically can be found in ROBERT WALTER, Hans Kelsen: Eine Leben im Dienste der 
Wissenschaft (Vienna: Manzsche Verlag, 1985).
12
 As yet, there exists no survey of Kelsen=s work as a whole in any language.  Even the core of Kelsen=s work, 
his Apure theory@ of law, has been surveyed in book length only once, WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, The Pure Theory of Law
(1945; New York: A.M. Kelly, 1969).  Although this book was valid in its time, it became dated with Kelsen=s 1960 
publication of the second, definitive edition of Reine Rechtslehre.
13 HANS KELSEN, Die Staatslehre des Dante Alighieri (Vienna/Leipzig: Franz Deuticke, 1905).
14 HANS KELSEN, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtlehre. Entwickelt aus der Lehre vom Rechtssatre (Tübingen: 
J.C.B. Möhr, 1911).  The work has been translated into English by Stanley L. Paulson and Bonnie Litschewski as Main 
14
Kelsen served as legal advisor to the Austrian minister of war.  In 1918, he was appointed associate 
professor of law at the University of Vienna, and, after the conflict, became full professor of public 
and administrative law in 1919.  During this period, he was a part of the AVienna School,@ coming 
into contact with Otto Bauer, Max Adler, Joseph Schumpeter, and Ludwig von Mises, and 
numbering among his students several figures who would achieve prominence in later years, 
including Eric Voegelin and Charles Eisenmann.  After helping draft the new Austrian constitution, 
Kelsen was appointed a member of the Constitutional Court in 1921.  
Problems in the Theory of Public Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 
Kelsen=s role in leading the Constitutional Court to overturn lower court bans on remarriage, 
a legal prohibition sought by Catholic Church authorities, caused the Christian Social Party-led 
government to oust him from the tribunal in 1930.  The political climate became so hostile that 
Kelsen moved to Germany, taking up a chair in international law at the University of Cologne, where 
he began to focus on positive international law.  In 1932, he delivered his second series of lectures in 
The Hague on the topic (his first, in 1926, had reflected on the relationship between national law and 
international law).
15
With the coming to power of the Nazis in early 1933, Kelsen lost his teaching position at the 
University of Cologne.  In the fall of that same year, he emigrated to Geneva with his wife and two 
daughters to take up a position at the Institut Universitaire des Hautes Études, where he reflected on 
the integration of international law into national legislation.  In 1934, he published the first edition of 
what would become his masterpiece, Pure Theory of Law.15  In addition to his courses in Geneva, he 
briefly taught international law at the University of Prague, although increasing anti-Semitic 
agitation made it impossible for him to continue there.
15 HANS KELSEN, Reine Rechtslehre. Einleitung in die rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik (Leipzig/Vienna: 
Franz Deuticke, 1934).  The work has been translated into English by Bonnie Litschewski and Stanley L. Paulson as 
Introduction to Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
16
At the beginning of the Second World War, Kelsen, then already sixty years -old, moved to 
the United States.  From 1940 to 1942, he was a research associate at Harvard University, delivering 
the 1940-1941 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures at Harvard Law School that were eventually 
published as Law and Peace in International Relations.16  In 1942, with the assistance of Roscoe 
Pound who declared him Athe leading jurist of the time,@ Kelsen was appointed visiting professor in 
the Department of Political Science of the University of California at Berkeley.  In 1945, he became 
a full professor as well as an American citizen.  Remaining at Berkeley until his retirement in 1952, 
Kelsen devoted himself to international law, publishing during the period, among other works,
Society and Nature,17 Peace through Law, 18 and General Theory of Law and the State,19 as well as 
serving as a legal advisor to the United Nations War Crimes Commission, with the task of preparing 
the legal and technical aspects for the eventual Nuremburg tribunal.  During this period, Kelsen also 
devoted considerable attention to the nascent United Nations organization, publishing  the 
16 HANS KELSEN, Law and Peace in International Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 1942).
17 HANS KELSEN, Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943).
18 HANS KELSEN, Peace through Law (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1944).
19 HANS KELSEN, General Theory of Law and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
17
monumental 900-page monograph on The Law of the United Nations,20 a work that, although now 
outdated, went through several editions and numerous reprintings between 1950 and 1966.
1945).
20 HANS KELSEN, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (New York: 
Frederick A. Praeger, 1950).
18
After his retirement from teaching in 1952, he remained highly active, publishing that very 
year his seminal Principles of International Law.21  In 1953, he gave a third series of lectures in The 
Hague.  In subsequent years, he served as a visiting profess at a number of institutions, including the 
Universities of Vienna, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Edinburgh, and Chicago.  In 1960, he published the 
second, definitive edition of Reine Rechtslehre,22 a complete revision of the previous edition.  Hans 
Kelsen died in Berkeley on April 19, 1973, leaving behind a legacy of some four hundred published 
works, some of which has been translated into some two dozen languages.23
Kelsen=s influence on the jurisprudence of the United Nations C if Ajurisprudence@ is the 
correct term for the Orwellian corpus produced by the legal hodgepodge of overlapping conventions, 
commissions, committees, and other Adeliberative@ bodies C cannot be underestimated.  In their 
meticulous article-by-article commentary on the sources and redaction of the UN Charter, Jean-
Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet cite Kelsen=s influence dozens of times.24  Beyond the Charter, it is the 
role that Kelsen=s theoretical vision plays in laying the intellectual foundations for the world body=s 
21 HANS KELSEN, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehard & Co., 1952).
22 HANS KELSEN, Reine Rechtslehre (Vienna: Franz Deuticke, 1960).  This work was published in English as 
Pure Theory of Law, translated by Max Knight (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1967).  
All subsequent citations from Pure Theory of Law (hereafter PTL) are from this edition, the work of a former student of 
its author, who personally checked the translation.
23
 An updated bibliography, arranged chronologically by date of the publication of the original work, of Han 
Kelsen=s works and their translations is maintained by the Hans-Kelsen-Institut of Vienna at: www-bunken.tamacc.chou-
u.ac.jp/scholar/morisue/datei.htm.
24 JEAN-PIERRE COT and ALAIN PELLET, La Charte des Nations Unis. Commentaire article par article (Paris: 
Éditions Economica, 1985).  The absence of an index of names renders the use of this remarkable reference book a bit 
fastidious.
19
overall ideology of the binding nature of its Aconsensus@ that is of capital importance.25  Before 
arriving at that point, however, it is necessary to examine some of the basic tenets of Kelsen=s legal 
philosophy.
25
 In all fairness to the remarkable figure of Hans Kelsen, it should be noted that the jurist probably never 
imagined the influence that his theories would take on as the legal ideology of a movement toward global governance, 
much less might approve of the consequences of that development.  That being said, however, the influence is 
nonetheless real.
20
In his Pure Theory of Law, Kelsen adopted the view that law is a strictly formal construct26
without regard for questions of content: ASince the law regulates the procedure by which it is itself 
created, one might distinguish this legally regulated procedure as legal form from the legal content
established by the procedure, and speak of a legally irrelevant legal content.@27  Kelsen was only 
interested in the mechanism for the production of these legal norms, their validity, and the 
obligations that they entailed, affirming that Aa definition of law, which does not determine law as a 
coercive act, must be rejected.@28  This reductionism, Kelsen reckoned, was the necessary price to 
pay in order to achieve a legal theory that of a scientifically irreproachable purity:29
The obvious statement that the object of the science of law is the law includes the 
less obvious statement that the object of the science of law is legal norms, but human 
behavior only to the extent that it is determined by legal norms as condition or 
consequence, in other words, to the extent that human behavior is the content of legal 
norms.  Interhuman relations are objects of the science of law as legal relations only, 
that is, as relations constituted by legal norms.  The science of law endeavors to 
comprehend its object Alegally,@ namely from the viewpoint of the law.  To 
comprehend something legally means to comprehend something as law, that is, as 
legal norm or as the content of a legal norm C as determined by a legal norm.30
26
 Although Kelsen and some of his disciples resented the characterization of his Apure theory@ as Aformal,@ a 
more dispassionate analysis of his thought permits no other conclusion.  See IAIN STEWART, AThe Critical Legal Science 
of Hans Kelsen,@ Journal of Law and Society 17/3 (1990): 273-308.
27 PTL, 53.
28 PTL, 54.
29
 This preoccupation with vindicating the law as a Ascience@ (Wissenschaft) and overcoming the tension 
between science and historicity, between Ais@ and Aought,@ introduced by Kant, and proposing a Aunified science@
characterized Kelsen=s endeavors from the beginning.  As he acknowledged in the preface to the first edition of Reine 
Rechtslehre in 1934: AIt is more than two decades since I undertook the development of a pure theory of law, that is, a 
theory of law purified of all political ideology and all natural-scientific elements and conscious of its particular character 
because conscious of the particular laws governing its object.  Right from the start, therefore, my aim was to raise 
jurisprudence, which openly or covertly was almost completely wrapped up in legal-political argumentation 
[Raisonnement], to the level of a genuine science, a science of the mind [Geistes-Wissenschaft]@ (iii).
30 PTL, 70.
21
In this reductionist vision, the question of the norm becomes central since Athose norms, then, 
which have the character of legal norms and which make certain acts legal or illegal are the objects 
of the science of law.@31
By Anorm@ we mean that something ought to be or ought to happen32...To say that the 
behavior of an individual is commanded by an objectively valid norm amounts to the 
same as saying the individual is obliged to behave in this way.  If the individual 
behaves as the norm commands he fulfills his obligation C he obeys the norm; if he 
behaves in the opposite way, he Aviolates@ the norm C he violates his obligation33
...The norm that is regarded as objectively valid, functions as a standard of value 
applied to actual behavior.34
None of the classical questions of Afirst principles@ is permitted in this schema:
31 PTL, 4.
32 PTL, 4.
33 PTL, 15.
34 PTL, 17.
22
The object of a scientific theory of value can only be norms enacted by human will 
and values constituted by these norms35 ...A norm, however, cannot be either true or 
untrue, but only valid or not valid.36
35 PTL, 18.
36 PTL, 19.
23
What distinguishes the legal order from other social orders (economic, religious, cultural, 
etc.) is its monopoly on coercion: AThe decisive criterion is the element of force C that means that 
the act prescribed by the order as a consequence of socially detrimental facts ought to be executed 
even against the will of the individual and, if he resists, by physical force.@37  This requires strong 
judicial and executive organs: ACollective security reaches its highest degree when the legal order 
installs law courts with compulsory jurisdiction and central executive organs whose coercive means 
are so effective that resistance ordinarily is hopeless.@38   It should be recalled, however, that C in 
contrast with older philosophies of law such as the classical formulation of St. Thomas Aquinas of 
law (Aid quod iustum est@) as an ideal justice based on the divine will or Montesquieu=s more modern 
definition of law as the necessary relations flowing from the nature of things as revealed by reason39
C in Kelsen=s system the actions that government agents may compel do not derive their objective 
validity  Afrom the factual act, that is to say, from an is, but again from a norm authorizing this act, 
that is to say, from an ought.@40
37 PTL, 34.
38 PTL, 37.
39
 Cf. JOHN GUEGEN, ABeyond Legal Positivism and Legal Naturalism: A Lesson from St. Thomas Aquinas,@ in 
JOHN A. MURLEY, ROBERT L. STONE, and WILLIAM T. BRAITHWAITE (eds.), Law and Philosophy: The Practice of 
Theory. Essays in Honor of George Anastaplo, vol. 1 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1992), 258-271.
40 PTL, 9.
24
It is this context that Kelsen added that the Anorms according to which men ought to behave 
in a certain way can also be created by custom,@ explaining that Aif men who socially live together 
behave for some time and under the same circumstances in the same way, then a tendency C that is, 
psychologically, a will C comes into existence within the men to behave as the members of the group 
habitually do.@41  This, then, becomes the basis for the importance that, in the ambiance of the United 
Nations and its hangers-on in the NGOs, is attributed to the Ainternational consensus@ as the 
expression of the Ageneral will@ of the world:  with neither content nor any objective outside point of 
reference, judges will have to fill the void with something.  As Posner has observed, Kelsen advised 
the judge to use Aideology@ to Acreate the specific legal norms needed for deciding cases not ruled by 
preexisting law.@42
41 PTL, 9.
42 POSNER, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 268; the author is interpreting the complex argument of PTL, 
104-106.
25
The rapid expansion of claims of jurisdiction for alleged crimes against humanity is an 
example of how the two distinct juridical notions, custom and consensus, have been intertwined to 
achieve an ideologically-desired outcome, irrespective of the actual law on the books.  A case in 
point is the arrest in Great Britain for the former Chilean president, General Augusto Pinochet.  
Regardless of one=s views on the former military ruler and the actions of his regime, particularly 
during the period immediately after it took power in 1973, the facts of the case are not disputed.  On 
September 21, 1998, the former head of state, then a senator-for-life under the provisions of the 
Chilean constitution, entered Great Britain using a diplomatic passport.  On October 9, he underwent 
surgery in a London hospital for back pain.  A week later, on October 16, he was awakened in the 
hospital where he was recovering by agents of Scotland Yard serving him with an arrest warrant 
issued by a Spanish magistrate who is investigating the deaths of Spanish nationals in the wake of 
the general=s seizure of power in 1973.43  The case then dragged on for 503 days until March 2, 2000, 
when the British Foreign Office decides to free the 84-year-old Pinochet on humanitarian grounds, 
citing his failing health.
Also clear in the case are the international statutory and customary laws on the matter.  In 
addition to the sovereign immunity that international law confers on General Pinochet for his official 
actions while head of state C an immunity correctly recognized by Lord Chief Justice Thomas 
43
 It should be noted that the magistrate in question, Balthazar Garzón, has carved himself a reputation for 
harassing high-profile Adefendants.@  Since his failure to get custody of General Augosto Pinochet, he has attempted, 
using a variety of international legal instruments and ad hoc juridical justifications, to have detained Italian Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and amnestied ex-members of the former 
military government in Argentine.  He has also investigated former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, now living in 
exile in Japan.  One cannot help but note a certain political bias in the subjects he has selected for his Ajudicial@ inquiries. 
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Bingham in his original ruling of October 28, 1998, before the politicization of the case C the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,44 to which both Great Britain and Chile adhere, is clear 
on the immunities enjoyed by holders of diplomatic passports, including the former Chilean 
president who was traveling on one: AThe person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall 
not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect 
and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.@45  This 
immunity can only be waived by the State issuing the passport,46 in this case Chile, which formally 
protested the former president=s detention on October 17, the day after his arrest.  Furthermore, the 
immunity also applies if the holder of the passport travels through another country: AIf a diplomatic 
agent passes through or is in the territory of a third State, which has granted him a passport visa if 
44 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, signed April 18, 1961; entered into force April 24, 1964.  
Originally signed by sixty States plus the Holy See, presently 178 States have ratified it.
45 Vienna Convention, art. 29.
46 Vienna Convention, art. 32.
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such visa was necessary...the third State shall accord him inviolability and such other immunities as 
may be required to ensure his transit or return.@47
47 Vienna Convention, art. 40.
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In the case of Great Britain, its treaty obligations required it respect the immunities that the 
Chilean government had seen fit to accord General Pinochet when the latter issued him a diplomatic 
passport.  If the British authorities found the comings and goings of the former military ruler 
objectionable, they had the right to refuse him passage, but once they had admitted him under 
diplomatic cover, the traditional understanding at the time was that they were obliged to respect that 
cover.48
However, the British government and courts, under relentless pressure from the media and 
pressure groups, discovered a new Aconsensus@ C albeit one never codified by the same solemnities 
as the Vienna Convention C that permitted it to justify a total innovation: the arrest of the holder of a 
diplomatic passport with a view at deporting him to a third country.49  Thus, in one fell swoop, a new 
48
 Cf. EILEEN DENZA, Diplomatic Law, A Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 2nd
rev. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
49
 Even if one accepts the somewhat far-fetched claim by the Spanish judge Balthazar Garzón that the actions 
carried out by the regime of then-President Augusto Pinochet amounted to the crime of Agenocide@ as defined by the 1948 
United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, there remains the fact that the British 
Parliament, when it ratified that international agreement with the passage of the United Kingdom Genocide Act of 1969 
deliberately omitted article IV, which lifts sovereign immunity.  Hence, even if General Pinochet were guilty, there was 
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lex gentium was inaugurated based on a Aconsensus@ of Aworld opinion.@  Kelsen=s theory anticipated 
such a move:
no British statutory authority duly passed according to the Britain=s unwritten constitution on which to actually hold and 
extradite him.  And even if one accepted the legal reasoning adopted by the Judiciary Committee of the British House of 
Lords in its November 25, 1998, appellate opinion overturning the Lord Chief Justice=s ruling that Ainternational law has 
made it plain that certain types of conduct...are not acceptable conduct on the part of anyone,@ it is a still a leap from that 
conclusion to endowing a magistrate with domestic jurisdiction in another country with the enforcing that principle on the 
national of still another country.  See HENRY A. KISSINGER, AThe Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction,@Foreign Affairs 80/4 
(July/August 2001): 86-96.
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Traditional science of law assumes that opinio necessitatis is an essential component 
of the facts of custom.  That is to say that the acts which constitute the custom must 
take place in the belief that they ought to take place.  But this opinion presupposes an 
individual or collective act of will whose subjective meaning is that one ought to 
behave according to custom.  If customary law, like statutory law, is positive law, 
then there must be an individual or collective act of will whose subjective meaning is 
the Aought@ C that is interpreted as objectively valid norm, as customary law.50
What is at stake here is not the hallowed custom that is a secondary source of law in civil law 
societies, much less the common law of societies that follow Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence.  Rather, 
what Kelsen proposes is a sociological circle wherein the norm ought to reflect the conduct of the 
members of the group.  This Aconsensus@ is interpreted to be the expression of a Ageneral will,@ that is 
then obligatory on all as a norm:
At first the subjective meaning of the acts that constitute the custom is not an ought.  
But later, when these acts have existed for some time, the idea arises in the individual 
member that he ought to behave in the manner in which the other members 
customarily behave, and at the same time the will arises that the other members ought 
to behave in that same way.  If one member of the group does not behave in the 
manner in which the other members customarily behave, then his behavior will be 
disapproved by the others, as contrary to their will.  In this way the custom becomes 
the expression of a collective will whose subjective meaning is an ought.51
50 PTL, 226.
51 PTL, 9.
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Even as he referred to the sociological nature of the process for the formation of norms, 
Kelsen rejected any recourse to the use of Asociology@ in se C or what might today be referred to as 
the Asocial sciences@ C in adjudicating the contents of the norms, in order to preserve his Apure 
theory@from contamination by the use of tools other than logic.52
Over the long run, this approach tends to generalize customary practices never formally 
subject to the usual give-and-take of legislative debate whereby a constitutional consent is normally 
given, and arrives at canonizing a Aconsensus@ that obliges all to submit to it.  It is, in short, precisely 
the incremental Aconsensus@-driven legal approach of the UN organs, which adhere to a corollary 
construct of legal order seen as a pyramid-like structure:
Because of the dynamic character of law, a norm is valid because, and to the extent 
that, it had been created in a certain way, that is in a way determined by another 
norm, therefore that other norm is the immediate reason for the validity of the new 
norm.  The relationship between the norm that regulates the creation of another norm 
and the norm created in conformity with the former can be metaphorically presented 
as a relationship of super- and subordination.  The norm which regulates the creation 
of another norm is the higher, the norm created in conformity with the former is the 
lower one.  The legal order is not a system of coordinated norms of equal level, but a 
hierarchy of different levels of legal norms.  Its unity is brought about by the 
connection that results from the fact that a validity of a norm, created according to 
another norm, rests on that other norm, whose creation, in turn, is determined by a 
third one.  This is a regression that ultimately ends up in the presupposed basic norm 
[Grundnorm].  This basic norm, therefore, is the highest reason for the validity of the 
norms, one created in conformity with another, thus forming a legal order in its 
52
 On Kelsen=s ideas regarding the sociology of justice, see RENATO TREVES, AHans Kelsen et la sociologie du 
droit,@ Droit et Société 1 (1985): 15-25.
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hierarchical structure.53
53 PTL, 221-222.
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This passage, needless to say, eerily presages the actual modus operandi of the various 
specialized UN organs and the NGOs associated with the fields of competence of those official 
agencies.  The evolution of the situation leading up to the present furor over America=s alleged 
Aunilateralism@ on environmental issues neatly illustrates the point.54  In the late 1960s, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council decided to convene an international conference on the 
environment.  After several years of preparatory meetings and the establishment of various panels of 
experts, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment met in Stockholm for eleven 
days, June 5-16, 1972.  The chief accomplishments of the Stockholm Conference, as it came to be 
known, were the publication of a AStockholm Declaration@ containing some twenty-six Aprinciples of 
common conviction@ and to call for a follow-up conference.  As it turns out, this conference took two 
decades to organize, although during the interim, a UN Commission on Environment and 
Development was constituted.  In 1987, this body, subsequently known as the Brundtland 
Commission after its president, former Norwegian prime minister Go Harlem Brundtland, issued a 
report calling for the establishment of an Ainternational charter for sustainable development.@  This 
task was taken up by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development that, meeting 
in Rio do Janeiro June 3-14, 1992, reaffirmed the AStockholm Declaration@ and  issued its own ARio 
Declaration@ with twenty-seven principles and a wish-list entitled AAgenda 21.@  Just before the 
conference in Rio do Janeiro, the AUnited Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change@ was 
signed in New York on May 9, 1992.  The much-controverted Kyoto Protocol of December 11, 
54
 For a discussion of the scientific controversies surrounding the issues involved in the international 
environmental debate, see JACK M. HOLLANDER, ARushing to Judgment,@ The Wilson Quarterly 27/2 (Spring 2003): 64-
77; also V. RAMANATHAN and TIM P. BARNETT, AExperimenting with the Earth,@ The Wilson Quarterly 27/2 (Spring 
2003): 78B84. 
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1997, is officially an instrument of implementation for this earlier convention.
The Rio do Janeiro meeting was followed by two ministerial-level conferences in Nairobi 
(1997) and Malmo (2000) which, in turn, led to the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
Johannesburg (August 26-September 4, 2002).  This meeting issued a thirty-seven point political 
ADeclaration@55 as well as a detailed APlan of Implementation.@56  The latter document is a detailed 
regulatory undertaking to carry out the objectives of not only the present conference, but all of its 
predecessors.  Its preamble deserves to be quoted in its entirety given the remarkable similarity to the 
process outlined by Kelsen with one norm founded on little else but the previous norm:
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held 
in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, provided the fundamental principles and the program of 
action for achieving sustainable development. We strongly reaffirm our commitment 
to the Rio principles, the full implementation of Agenda 21 and the Program for the 
55 WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Declaration on Sustainable Development (17th Plenary 
Session, September 4, 2002).  For the text of the document, see: www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD-
/English/POI_PD.htm.
56 WORLD SUMMIT ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Plan of Implementation.  For the text of the document, see: 
www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm.  The document contains, among others, the 
provision that: AGood governance at the international level is fundamental for achieving sustainable development. In 
order to ensure a dynamic and enabling international economic environment, it is important to promote global economic 
governance...A vibrant and effective United Nations system is fundamental to the promotion of international cooperation 
for sustainable development and to a global economic system that works for all. To this effect, a firm commitment to the 
ideals of the United Nations, the principles of international law and those enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, 
as well as to strengthening the United Nations system and other multilateral institutions and promoting the improvement 
of their operations, is essential. States should also fulfil their commitment to negotiate and finalize as soon as possible a 
United Nations convention@ (n. 141-142).  Not only is global governance is advocated, but the text goes beyond the 
principle pacta sunt servanda, that nation-states should observe the obligations they assume, to admonish states to take 
on the obligations! 
35
Further Implementation of Agenda 21. We also commit ourselves to achieving the 
internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the United 
Nations Millennium Declaration and in the outcomes of the major United Nations 
conferences and international agreements since 1992. The present plan of 
implementation will further build on the achievements made since UNCED and 
expedite the realization of the remaining goals.57
57 Plan of Implementation, n. 1-2.
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The concerning feature of this pyramid construction is that the juridical norm does not oblige 
by reason of consent, much less by the inherently compelling nature of the truth claims of its content
or their relationship to the demands of justice, as understood by classical philosophers and jurists.  
For Kelsen, Athere are no mala in se, only mala prohibita,@58 that is, no crimes that are wrong in 
themselves rather than wrongly simply by being declared wrong by the law.  No, a norm is rendered 
obligatory by reason of its logical coherence with the normative scheme for the production of 
juridical norms, as Kelsen noted:
The norm system that presents itself as a legal order has essentially a dynamic 
character.  A legal norm is not valid because it has a certain content, that is, because 
the content is logically deducible from a presupposed basic norm [Grundnorm], but 
because it was created in a certain way C ultimately in a way determined by the a 
presupposed basic norm.  For this reason alone does the legal norm belong to the 
legal order whose norms are created to this basic norm.  Therefore any kind of 
content might be law.  There is no human behavior which, as such, is excluded from 
being the content of a legal norm.  The validity of a legal norm may not be denied for 
being (in its content) in conflict with another norm that does not belong to the legal 
order whose basic norm is the reason for the validity of the norm in question.59
Once he had established that law was a pyramid-like system of norms, Kelsen was confronted 
58 PTL, 112.
59 PTL, 198.
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with the question: AWhat constitutes the unity of a multitude of norms?@60  Closely tied to this 
question is another one: AWhy is a norm valid, what is the reason for its validity?@61  The answer 
Kelsen gives to these queries is almost Kantian:
60 PTL, 193.
61 PTL, 193.
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The norm which represents the reason for the validity of another norm is called, as 
we have said, the Ahigher@ norm.  But the search for the reason of a norm=s validity 
cannot go on indefinitely like the search for cause and effect.  It must end with a 
norm which, as the last and highest, is presupposed.  It must be presupposed, because 
it cannot be Aposited,@ that is to say: created, by an authority whose competence 
would have to rest on a still higher norm.  This final norm=s validity cannot be 
derived from a higher norm, the reason for its validity cannot be questioned...All 
norms whose validity can be traced back to one and the same basic norm 
[Grundnorm] constitute a system of norms, a normative order.  The basic norm is the 
common source for the validity of all norms that belong to the same order C it is their 
common reason of validity.62
Therefore a given norm is binding by reason of the validity conferred on it by a higher norm.  
It must be obeyed by individuals; any disobedience must be punished.  Kelsen added that this 
normative system is the basis for the state since Aas a political organization, the state is a legal order,@
specifically a Arelatively centralized legal order.@63    He went on to define the state as Aa corporation, 
that is, a community constituted by a normative order which institutes organs directly or indirectly 
...the order constituting this community is the legal order, designated as national legal order in 
62 PTL, 194-195.
63 PTL, 286.
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contradistinction to the international legal order.@64
64 PTL, 290.
40
While the question of the basic norm (Grundnorm) was formulated in reference to the state, it 
also enters into play C both in Kelsen=s philosophy of law and for purposes of the present inquiry 
into the legal ideology driving the UN=s ambitions to governance C in questions regarding the 
relationship of the law of the nation-state and international law.  There are two schools of thought in 
this regard.  The classical view, since the Peace of Westphalia (1644) ended the Wars of Religion in 
Europe, has been that a norm of international law is binding on a given sovereign state only if the 
government of that state, through the means provided for in its constitution, has explicitly recognized 
that international norm.65  According to this view, international law constitutes Aonly a part of the 
national legal order, regarded as sovereign@ and Athe validity of the national legal order is the basic 
norm referring to the effective constitution@66 of the state.  
Kelsen, however, proposed a revolutionary view wherein:
International law is not regarded as part of the national legal order, but as a sovereign 
65
 On the development of the Westphalian idea of sovereignty as well as the incremental assaults on it in recent 
times, see DAVID FAGELSON, ATwo Concepts of Sovereignty: From Westphalia to the Law of Peoples?,@ International 
Politics 38/4 (2001): 499-514.  For a different reading of the same history with a relatively sympathetic treatment of 
recent developments, see DANIEL PHILPOTT, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International 
Relations (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton, University Press, 2001), 73-105. 
66 PTL, 214.
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legal order, superordinated to all national legal orders, limiting them in their spheres 
of validity; if, in other words, one does not assume the primacy of national legal 
orders, but the primacy of the international legal order.  The latter does, in fact, 
contain a norm that represents the reason for the validity of the individual national 
legal orders.67
67 PTL, 214.
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Kelsen explained his view by noting that international law Aconsists of norms which 
originally were created by custom, that is by acts of the national states or, more correctly formulated, 
by the state organs authorized by national legal orders to regulate interstate relations.@68  These norms 
are Ageneral@ in that they create rights and obligations for all states.  Among these norms, Kelsen 
cited the principle Apacta sunt servanda@ (Apacts should be respected@), whereby individual states 
regulate by treaty the mutual relations between their organs and subjects.  The authorized organs of 
the states, in Kelsen=s terms, agree in the creation of norms whereby rights are created and 
obligations are imposed between them.  Kelsen, however, noted that international law created by 
such bilateral treaties Adoes not have general but only particular character@ since Aits norms are not 
valid for all states, but only for two or a larger and smaller group of states,@ thus constituting only 
Apartial communities.@69  Consequently, Aparticular international law created by treaties and general 
international customary law are not to be regarded as norms on the same level@ since Athe basis of the 
one group of norms is a norm that is part of another group, the two have a relation of a higher and a 
lower level of hierarchy.@70
According to Kelsen, beyond these two lies a third level:
If we consider also the legal norms created by international courts and by other 
international organs, established by treaties, a third level appears in the structure of 
international law.  For the function of such an organ is itself based on an international 
68 PTL, 323.
69 PTL, 324.
70 PTL, 324.
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treaty, that is to say, on a norm of the second level of international law.  Since this 
second level, that is the international law created by international treaties, rests upon 
the norm of general customary international law (the highest level), the presupposed  
basic norm [Grundnorm] of international law must be a norm which establishes 
custom constituted by mutual behavior of states as law-creating fact.71
71 PTL, 324.
One notes in this the preeminent role attributed to custom in the formation of national law is 
extended to the creation of international law.  In other words, if established constitutional convention 
C the active Aconsent of the governed@ of American Founding Fathers C is the foundation of the 
national legal system, the passive Aconsensus@ of the Acommunity of nations@ is the basis for 
international law.  And international organizations, their functionaries, and international tribunals are 
charged with articulating what that Aconsensus@ consists of specifically.  Writing in the late 1950s, 
Kelsen admitted that his envisioned international legal order was only in its infancy, but he predicted 
its potential for growth:
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International law, as a coercive order, shows the same character as national law, i.e., 
the law of a state, but differs from it and shows a certain similarity with the law of 
primitive, i.e., stateless society in that international law (as a general law that binds 
all states) does not establish special organs for the creation and application of norms. 
 It is still in a state of far-reaching decentralization.  It is only at the beginning of a 
development which national law has already completed.72
This vision of international law necessarily entails the subordination of national legal systems 
to a global system, that is, the transfer of sovereignty from national states to the overarching structure 
of an supranational federation if not the total absorption of that sovereignty by a single global Asuper-
state@ that would be sole subject of sovereignty:
72 PTL, 323.
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International law is Alaw,@ if it is a coercive order, that is to say, a set of norms 
regulating human behavior by attaching certain coercive acts (sanctions) as 
consequences to certain facts, as delicts, determined by this order as conditions, and 
if, therefore, it can be described in sentences which C in contradistinction to legal 
norms C may be described as Arules of law.@73
Writing long before Aglobalization@ became a catch phrase to describe an ill-defined 
phenomenon,74 Kelsen argued that this evolution towards a single global order was a logical 
necessity given the identification of the state and its legal system.  The international legal system was 
thus conceived as an instrument for the unification and centralization of a global society that would 
be characterized less by Ainter-nationalism@ than by Asupra-nationalism@:
73 PTL, 320.
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 Pundits still differ on what Aglobalization@ actually is, what the phenomenon actually consists of.  Some, such 
as New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman see it as a Adynamic ongoing process,@ driven by economics but having a 
cultural dimensions; see THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, rev. ed. (New York: Anchor Books, 
2000), 3-16.  Others, like British philosopher Roger Scruton, see it in terms of the transfer of power to global 
organizations; see ROGER SCRUTON, The West and the Rest: Globalization and the Terrorist Threat (Wilmington, 
Delaware: Intercollegiate Studies Institute, 2002).  In his book, Scruton writes: AGlobalization does not mean merely the 
expansion of communications, contacts, and trade across the globe.  It means the transfer of social, economic, political, 
and juridical power to global organizations, by which I mean organizations that are located in no particular sovereign 
jurisdiction, and governed by no particular territorial law...These organizations pose a new kind of threat to the only form 
of sovereignty that has brought lasting (albeit local) peace to our planet@ (127).
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The entire legally technical movement, as outlined here, has C in the last analysis C
the tendency to blur the border line between international and national law, so that as 
the ultimate goal of the legal development directed toward increasing centralization, 
appears the organizational unity of a universal legal community, that is, the 
emergence of a world state.75
75 PTL, 328.
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This is not only the monopolization of sovereignty by a super-state but, moreover, an 
inversion of the traditional principal of subsidiarity.  In this scheme, it is not the super-state that 
plays a complementary role vis-à-vis individual states, but rather the latter that are subsidiaries of the 
former.  If the point of departure is assumed, as in Kelsen, to be that the validity of the international 
legal system, then the validity of national legal systems must be based on their submission to an 
supranational system: AInternational law must be conceived...as a total legal order comprising all 
national legal systems as partial orders, and superior to all of them.@76
Consequently, if one accepts this line of reasoning C and recognition of this point explains 
the moral indignation with which the withdrawal of the American signature from the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court was greeted C international tribunals must be able to override 
national judicial systems since the judges of these international assizes, in collaboration with 
international functionaries, must affirm the superiority of global governance over national 
sovereignty: 
It becomes manifest that what is regarded as conflict between the norms of 
international law and the norms of national law is not a conflict of norms at all...It 
has been shown before that a norm contrary to a norm does not mean a conflict 
between a norm of a lower level and a norm of a higher level, but only means that the 
validity of the lower may be abolished or the responsible organ may be punished.77
76 PTL, 333.
77 PTL, 330.
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It does not require a conspiratorial mind set to note that the instruments for vindicating these 
claims are being put into place with the establishment of the International Criminal Court.  In a break 
with centuries-old principles of the lex gentium, the Rome Statute extends the Court=s jurisdiction 
even to citizens of countries that are either not signatories or signatories who have not ratified the 
treaty.78  And, in addition to the International Criminal Court, to which some attention has been 
78
 Even for citizens of states that have ratified the Rome Statute and, consequently, undeniably subject legally to 
its jurisdiction, the International Criminal Court=s structure should be of little comfort.  As an institution, the Court is 
police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and jailer C all these functions being performed by its staff without regard for any 
separation of powers.  And there are no provisions for appeal from its judgments.  For a general critique, see LEE A. 
CASEY and DAVID B. RIVKIN, JR., The International Criminal Court vs. The American People, Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder 1249 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 1999). For another critical appraisal of the Court, including its 
statutory conflicts with the United States Constitution, see GARY T. DEMPSEY, Reasonable Doubt: The Case Against the 
Proposed International Criminal Court, Cato Policy Analysis 311 (Washington: Cato Institute, 1998).  On the question 
of the judicial independence of the International Criminal Court C whose judges, once selected by a political process, 
will have extraordinary discretionary authority C see SILVIA DE BERTODANO, AJudicial Independence in the International 
Criminal Court,@ Leiden Journal of International Law 15/2 (2002): 409-430.
Even proponents of international assizes admit the shortcomings C to put it mildly C of recent experiences; see 
DAVID TOLBERT, AThe International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Unforeseen Successes and 
Foreseeable Shortcomings,@ The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 26/2 (Summer/Fall 2002): 7-19; also VICTOR PESKIN, 
AConflicts of Justice: An Analysis of the Role of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,@ International 
Peacekeeping 6 (2000): 128-137.  An observer=s journal of the difficulties encountered by the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, complete with some disturbing anecdotal accounts, is found in VICTOR PESKIN, ARwandan 
Ghosts,@ Legal Affairs 1/3 (September/October 2002): 21-25.  Serious questions of procedural safeguards for the rights 
of defendants before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are raised in RENÉE C. PRUITT,
AGuilt by Majority in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Does This Meet the Standard of 
Proof >Beyond Reasonable Doubt=?,@ Leiden Journal of International Law 10/3 (1997): 557-578.
The personal diplomatic experience of the present author dealing with the Special Court for Sierra Leone during 
its formative period of 2001-2002 confirms in his mind some of the myriad of systematic procedural difficulties and lack 
of legal guarantees associated with these international tribunals.  The Special Court is directly not a United Nations 
organ, but an independent international institution with its own special status granted to it by the UN and the government 
of Sierra Leone to try alleged war crimes that occurred during the brutal civil conflict in that West African nation.  It has 
jurisdiction only for offenses alleged to have occurred after November 30, 1996.
Although authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1315 of August 14, 2000, the Special Court only took 
shape when the UN Secretariat and the government of Sierra Leone agreed on a 23-article Astatus agreement@ and a 25-
article statute for the tribunal on January 16, 2002 C despite the fact that several of the principal potential defendants, 
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focused in recent years, there are other examples of the creeping expansionism of the global legal 
system.  To cite, by way of illustration, but one other example, there was the creation, by 50 to 3 vote 
of the United Nations Human Rights Commission on April 26, 2000, of a whole new office, that of 
the ASpecial Representative of the Secretary-General for Human Rights Defenders,@79 charged with 
enforcement of an ill-defined category of Arights@ (and their promoters, hence the job title) described 
including Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader Foday Sankoh, have been in custody since early 2000.  The 
implementing legislation for the tribunal was passed by the parliament of  Sierra Leone on March 19, 2002, and signed by 
President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah on March 29, 2002.  On April 17, 2002, UN Secretary-General Kofi A. Annan appointed 
David M. Crane, a former attorney with the U.S. Department of Defense, as the chief prosecutor for the Court and Briton 
Robin Vincent as its registrar.  The appointment of judges for three-member trial chamber and the five-member appeal 
chamber C the statute called for the Sierra Leonian government to appoint one trial judge and two appeals judges and the 
UN Secretary General to appoint two trial judges and three appeals judges and the two parties to agree on two alternate 
judges C was delayed until July 29, 2002.
Since then, the Court has been busy about many things, although one might be excused for asking if proceeding 
to an expeditious trial of the defendants is one of them.  The chief prosecutor, a well-respected international lawyer, has 
traveled extensively giving speeches at various international and national conferences and issued statements to 
commemorate such occasions as International Women=s Day, but only managed to indict five effective defendants  C two 
other men were indicted, but one was killed shortly thereafter in Liberia while the other is at large  C on March 10, 2003. 
 Some of the judges appointed have only been in Sierra Leone C the tribunal is to sit in the capital of Freetown C on the 
occasion of their swearing-in on December 2, 2002.  The five indicted defendants who were in custody were transferred 
to the custody of the Court on March 21, 2003.  It took another two weeks, until April 7, 2003, that the administrators of 
the tribunal came up with a statute for their imprisonment that regulated details of their incarceration, including the four-
day rotation of the menu.  As yet, no dates have been set for initial hearings, much less for trials.  A visit to the website of 
the tribunal (www.sc-sl.org) reveals that as late as May 1, 2003, several significant posts have yet to be filled, including 
that of defense counsel.  The lead defendant, Sankoh, died in custody on July 27, 2003, after waiting three years for 
proceedings against him to commence.
The entire episode has Kafka-like tone, a fact that does not seem to have concerned many of those associated 
with the process.  The Special Court=s statute states that it will rely for its procedural law on the jurisprudence of the 
appeals chambers of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, themselves both Aworks in progress.@  The defendants, as reprehensible as their alleged actions 
were, have now been held for over three years and have no clear indication of when their cases will be adjudicated.  And, 
even when it comes to judgment, the statute of the Court provides for a determination of guilt by a majority vote (i.e., two 
out of three judges of the trial bench (art. 18) C hardly much protection for the accused.  The Special Court, meanwhile, 
is looking at expanding its reach and has issued an arrest order for President Charles Ghankay Taylor of neighboring 
Liberia, citing his role in the Sierra Leonean conflict.
For a chronicle of the discussion surrounding the establishment and early development of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone, see CATHERINE CISSÉ, ALe Tribunal spécial pour la Sierra Leone,@ International Law FORUM du droit 
international 4/1 (2002): 7-11.
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 This office is to be distinguished from that of the AHigh Commissioner for Human Rights,@ created by the 
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as Auniversally recognized.@80  This development was, once again, postulated by Kelsen as part of the 
subsuming of national legal systems into a unitary international system: 
United Nations General Assembly in 1993.
80
 The Declaration on the Rights and Responsibilities of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote 
and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on December 9, 1998, by the 
53rd session of United Nations General Assembly as Resolution A/53/144, called upon each state to implement such 
varied list of  ambiguously defined Arights@ that the notorious homosexual pedophile group, the North American Man/Boy 
Love Association (NAMBLA), has used its provisions obliging states to respect Arights of association@ in its fight against 
U.S. prosecutors.
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If we start from the validity of international law that does not require recognition by 
the state, then the mentioned constitutional provision [of adherence to and ratification 
of the international norm by the state] does not mean that it puts into force 
international law for the state concerned, but merely that international law C by 
general clause C into national law.  Such transformation is needed, if the organs of 
the state, especially its tribunals, are only authorized (by the constitution) to apply 
national law; they can, therefore, apply international law only if its content has 
assumed the form of national law (statute, ordinance) that is, if it has been 
transformed into national law.  If, in default of transformation, a norm of 
international law cannot be applied in a concrete case, then (if we start from the 
validity of international law) this does not mean that this norm of international law is 
not valid for the state; it only means that, of it is not applied and therefore 
international law is violated by the state=s behavior, the state exposes itself to the 
sanctions prescribed by international law.81
In fact, the consequence of Kelsen=s legal philosophy is that the national state=s existence is 
dependent upon its adherence to the international juridical system:     
The national state, then, in its legal existence appears determined in all directions by 
international law, that is, as a legal order delegated by international law in its validity 
and sphere of validity.  Only the international legal order, not the national legal order, 
is sovereign.  If national legal orders or the legal communities constituted by them, 
i.e., the states, are denoted as Asovereign,@ this merely means that they are subject 
only to the international legal order.82
81 PTL, 336-337.
82 PTL, 338.
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This highlights one of the basic consequences of Kelsen=s theory: that there exists no 
difference in the nature of national law and international law.83  Traditionally, the jurisdiction of the 
national legal system was concerned with either the relationships between the state and its citizens 
(Apublic law,@ in the parlance of the civil law tradition) or the relationships between the citizens 
themselves (Aprivate law@).  The international legal system only concerned itself with relations 
between nation-states, international law being created through the consent of states.  Underlying this 
was the traditional doctrine that states, being sovereign, cannot be bound by higher laws without 
their consent.  Corollary to this was the principle, recognized by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice, the predecessor to the present-day International Court of Justice at The Hague, that a 
sovereign states may lawfully do as it pleases unless it has otherwise consented to restrict itself:
International law governs relations between independent States.  The rules of law 
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in 
conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and 
established in order to regulate relations between these co-existing independent 
83
 See FRANÇOIS RIGAUX, AHans Kelsen on International Law,@ European Journal of International Law 9/2 
(1998): 325-343.
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communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims.  Restrictions upon 
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.84
84
 This ruling was given in the case of the S.S. Lotus, published in Permanent Court of International Justice, 
Series A, no. 10, here cited from LORI F. DAMROSCH, MICHAEL C. PUGH, and LOUIS HENKIN (eds.), International Law: 
Cases and Materials, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minnesota: West, 2001), 68-69.  For an interesting analysis, in terms of this 
traditional international law doctrine, of the ABush Doctrine@ of the unilateral preemptive use of force, see ANTHONY 
CLARK AREND, AInternational Law and the Preemptive Use of Military Force,@ The Washington Quarterly 26/2 (Spring 
2003): 89-103.
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In contrast, Kelsen brought into focus the idea, now quite current in global circles, that 
international law is not confined to relations among states, but can encompass all areas of human 
activity.  In fact, an increasing quantity of international legislation now applies to private individuals, 
not merely to sovereign entities, raising a host of civil liberties questions.85  Other international 
agreements, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (1979) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), while binding on state parties, 
have given rise to permanent bureaucracies charged with Amonitoring@ the accords and generating, 
without the legal process of treaty adoption and ratification, ongoing norms.86  Recently, 
international law considerations have even been injected into both trial and appellate instances in 
domestic death penalty cases in the United States as lawyers have tried to get the courts to recognize 
international legal standards C some of which are matters of policy to which the U.S. government 
85
 See, for example, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, Constitutional Problems with Enforcing the Biological Weapons 
Convention, Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing 61 (Washington: Cato Institute, 2000).
86
 For the ongoing activities of the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, refer to its website: 
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs10.htm#ii.  For those of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women, see: www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/reports.htm. 
For a critical analysis of the two conventions and their effects on both familial law and national sovereignty, see 
PATRICK F. FAGAN, How U.N. Conventions On Women=s and Children=s Rights Undermine Family, Religion, and 
Sovereignty, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder 1407 (Washington: Heritage Foundation, 2001).  
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has never consented to C as applicable to individual defendants and enforceable against the 
individual American states.87
87
 See SANDRA BABCOCK, AThe Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty Cases,@ Leiden 
Journal of International Law 15/2 (2002): 367-387.
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In this new order, the traditional nation-state survives as a mere shadow of its former self, 
much in the manner that the member states of the European Union have seen more and more of their 
former legislative prerogatives taken over by the Brussels-based bureaucrats of the many regulatory 
agencies of the European Commission.  European Commission President Romano Prodi is very 
candid about this process: AThe genius of the founding fathers lay in translating extremely high 
political ambitions...into a series of more specific, almost technical decisions.  This indirect approach 
made further action possible.  Rapprochement took place gradually.  From confrontation, we moved 
to willingness to cooperate in the economic sphere and then on to integration.@88  According to 
Kelsen, the advent of the supranational order will leave individuals states entirely dependent upon 
the international system:
Since international law regulates the behavior of states, it must determine what is a 
Astate@ in the sense of international law C it must determine under what conditions 
individuals are to be regarded as the government of a state; therefore, under what 
conditions the coercive order under which they function is to be regarded as a valid 
legal order; under what conditions their acts are to be regarded as acts of state, that is, 
legal acts in the meaning of international law.89
Not only may the international legal system limit the sovereignty of the individual nation-
states, it may even eclipse it entirely:
88
 Speech at the Institut d=Études Politiques, Paris, on May 29, 2001.  Citing this success, Prodi went on to assert 
that, as a consequence, AEurope has a role to play in world governance@ based on replicating the European experience on 
a global scale. The entire text of the address can be found at the following internet address:  
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=SPEECH/01/244|0|AGED&lg=EN&display=.  
On the ideological foundations of the European Union and its bureaucracy, see ROLAND HUREAUX, Les hauteurs béantes 
de l=Europe. La dérive idéologique de la construction européenne (Paris: Éditions François-Xavier de Guibert, 1999).
89 PTL, 337.
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Although the individual states remain competent, in principle (even under 
international law) to regulate everything, they retain their competence only so far as 
international law does not regulate a subject matter and thereby withdraws it from 
free regulation by national law.  Under the assumption of international law as a 
supranational legal order, the national legal order, then, has no longer an illimitable 
competence (Kompetenzhoheit).90
90 PTL, 338.
Commenting on the relationship of national legal systems and European Community law with 
explicit reference to Kelsen=s legal philosophy, one scholar has asserted that this is precisely the case 
already with regard to the sovereignty of the nation-states that are members of the European Union:
58
If the basic norm also confers law creating powers on Community constitutional 
organs then the supremacy principle will resolve conflicts between national and 
Community constitutional norms...The supremacy principle subordinates substantive 
national constitutional norms to substantive Community constitutional norms...The 
relationship of subordination will result in the disapplication of the national 
constitutional norms in the areas falling under the competence of Community law 
and would afford a principle of construction requiring the courts to choose, whenever 
possible, the interpretation that is most compatible with Community principles.  It 
would also give the [European Court of Justice] ultimate jurisdiction in matters of 
interpretation.91
Of course the risk contained in an absolute principle whereby national legal systems must 
always defer to supranational systems is amply illustrated by the fact that, in the case of Europe, 
91 INES WEYLAND, AThe Application of Kelsen=s Theory of the Legal System to European Community Law - The 
Supremacy Puzzle Resolved,@ Law and Philosophy 21/1 (2002): 23-24.  For a discussion of the obligation of national 
executive and judicial authorities to defer to the European-wide norms, see JOHN TEMPLE LANG, AThe Duties of National 
Courts under Community Constitutional Law,@ European Law Review 22/1 (1997): 3-17; and IDEM, AThe Duties of 
National Authorities under Community Constitutional Law,@ European Law Review 23/1 (1998): 109-144. 
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community law is often more ambiguous and general than the more precisely-defined provisions 
contained in the legislation of some member-states as a consequence of not all rights being 
recognized by all member-states.  Hence, these rights are not encompassed in the Acommon 
traditions@ of the European Union which prevail, to the detriment of the principle of subsidiarity.92
92
 See LEONARD F.M. BESSELINK, AEntrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights, Pluralism 
and Subsidiarity in the European Union,@ Common Market Law Review 35/3 (1998): 629-680.  The complications that 
have arisen due to the application of overarching supranational jurisdiction over national jurisdictions ranges from 
matters of family law to those of environmental regulations; see ADELINA ADINOLFI, AThe Judicial Application of 
Community Law in Italy (1981-1997),@ Common Market Law Review 35/6 (1998): 1313-1369; also HANS PETTER 
GRAVER, AMission Impossible: Supranationality and Nationality Legal Autonomy in the EEA Agreement,@ European 
Foreign Affairs Review 7/1 (2002): 73-90.
On a more global level, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in its official 
Human Development Report 2002, a document that was entitled that year Deepening Democracy in a 
Fragmented World, hailed the new International Criminal Court in terms nearly identical to those set 
out by Kelsen regarding limits to traditional notions of national sovereignty:
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International relations have long been based on state sovereignty and sovereign 
immunity...The establishment of a widely ratified international court is a promising 
innovation...It limits territorial sovereignty by making leaders accountable to external 
standards.93
Nor does Kelsen allow that the creation of international organizations by treaties entered into 
by individual nation-states in anyway limit the claims of the new organization with respect to its 
constituting sovereignties:
It may be objected that the individual state cannot be conceived as an order delegated 
by international law, because historically the states C the national legal orders C
preceded the creation of general international law, which was established by custom 
prevalent among states.  This objection, however, is based on the lack of 
differentiation between the historical relation of facts and the logical relation of 
norms.  The family too, as a legal community, is older than the state which embraces 
many families; and yet the validity of family law is based upon the national legal 
order.  In the same way, the validity of the order of a single member state is based 
upon the constitution of the federal state, although the latter=s creation is later in time 
93 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a 
Fragmented World (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 105, 107.
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than the formerly independent states which only subsequently gathered together in a 
federal state.  Historical and normative-logical relations should not be confounded.94
94 PTL, 338-339.  The UNDP=s Human Development Report 2002, 108, chronicles approvingly the 
establishment of new international tribunals, noting that: AThese new processes challenge the traditional 
intergovernmental model of international relations. 
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There is a subtle, but significant, maneuver in this affirmation.  While Kelsen recognized that 
international law emerged at a later stage in history than national and that there was a time when the 
law of the nation-state was the supreme norm, his focus on the principle of efficacy means that he 
can both assert that the pre-international national system were valid C their then-validity being 
determined by some other, unexplained, method C and that their present validity nonetheless 
depends on the international system.  According to Kelsen, this principle, which as a norm of 
international law, determines the territorial sphere of validity of the state order, becomes, when he 
focuses on the analysis of the concept of a legal system, a condition of validity.  As he asserted in his 
earlier work General Theory of Law and the State, Aa norm is considered valid on the condition that 
it belongs to a system of norms, to an order which, on the whole, is efficacious.@95  Hence, without 
recourse to the norm of international law, Kelsen reaffirms the validity of these pre-international 
national systems with an appeal to efficacy.  Once the international system is established, he asserts 
the primacy of the international legal system over the national legal system and postulates that the 
national legal systems derive their validity from the basic norm of international law.
95 KELSEN, General Theory of Law and the State, 42.
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Thus Kelsen=s legal theory arrives back at the question of the basic norm (Grundnorm), a 
concept which, according to the author, is hypothetical.  Paraphrasing Kant, this is the postulate of 
juridical reason  that Kelsen=s project needs in order to cement its structure.  This hypothetical and 
presupposed basic norm is needed, according to the logic of Kelsen=s philosophy, not only to assure 
the validity of lower order norms, but also that of the international legal system itself: AAs a genuine 
basic norm, it is a presupposed C not a positive norm.  It represents the presupposition under which 
general international law is regarded as the set of objectively valid norms that regulate the mutual 
behavior of states...these norms are interpreted as legal norms binding the state.@96   The national 
laws of states constitute merely a Apartial system@ in relation to the universal jurisdiction of the 
international legal system.  Thus domestic norms can never conflict with international ones, on pain 
of nullity.
In the purely logical system constructed by Kelsen=s legal philosophy, there is no place for 
rights that precede the state, since the recognition of such rights would lead, according to the logic of 
his theory, into the intolerable subordination of the state to those rights.  This concern is all the more 
applicable in the case of the supranational state and its global legal monopoly, even at the expense of 
states.  The individual must simply obey the law because it law established as a norm by the state, 
and not because it is a just law deriving from reason or nature, much less from a divine command.97
96 PTL, 215-216.
97
 Kelsen himself admitted that, as a logical consequence of the APure Theory,@ even monstrous perversions of 
jurisprudence such as the Ajustice@ meted out by totalitarian regimes would qualify as Alegal.@  In the discussion following 
his conference on ADie Grundlage der Naturrechtslehre@ (AFoundation of the Theory of Natural Law@) in FRANZ MARTIN 
SCHMÖLZ (ed.), Das Naturrecht in der politischen Theorie. Internationales Forschungszentrum für Grundfragen der 
Wissenschaften in Salzburg (Vienna: Springer-Verlag, 1963), 1-37, he stated that: AFrom the point of view of juridical 
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In Kelsen=s system, the validity of a norm is assured if its emanation conformed with the established 
procedure for the creation of norms, that is, it based on the preceding level of norms and so on, back 
to the hypothetical, presupposed basic norm of the superiority of the supranational legal system.  It is 
a question of process rather than content as Kelsen made explicitly clear:
science, the legal system established by the Nazi regime was one of law. We can regret it, but we cannot deny that it was 
a rule of law.  The legal system of the Soviet Union is one of law! We can deplore it as we would a venomous serpent, 
but we cannot deny that it exist and can say what it will@ (the quotation is found in the discussion section at 148). 
Although Kelsen=s address was subsequently translated into English and published as HANS KELSEN, AFoundation of 
Natural Law Doctrine,@ Anglo-American Law Review 2 (1973): 87-111, the discussion section of the Salzburg conference 
was omitted by the translator.
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An individual who regards the law as a system of valid norms has to disregard morals 
as such a system, and one who regards morals as a system of valid norms has to 
disregard the law as such a system...no viewpoint exists from which both morals and 
law may simultaneously be regarded as valid normative orders.  No one can serve 
two masters.98
This is what renders Kelsen=s philosophy of law, distilled as it was in academia, a potent 
ideology in the international political sphere for those who would the United Nations as the nucleus 
for global governance.99  What is decided according to the procedures of the UN Charter is 
normative and binding, irrespective of content.  And since the mechanisms of the Charter favor 
Aconsensus,@ the Aconsensus@ of the world body determines what ought to occur or not occur.  In fact, 
98 PTL, 329.
99
 See CHARLES LEBEN, AHans Kelsen and the Advancement of International Law,@ European Journal of 
International Law 9/2 (1998): 287-305.  The author, who is unabashedly enthusiastic about increasing international 
jurisdiction, observed that: AThe particularly fascinating point of Kelsen=s thinking is not only the cogency and rigor of 
his reasoning but also the fact that his work, which was reputed to be theoretical, even dogmatic, and remote from the 
concerns of the real world, provides us with the sharpest conceptual tools with which to think through the contemporary 
developments of international law@ (287).
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many of the recent criticisms of Aunilateralism@ by proponents of a Amultilateral@ approach echo 
Kelsen=s division of legal theorists into those with Asubjectivistic@ viewpoints and Aobjectivistic@
vision:
The subjectivistic view starts from the sovereign Self in order to conceive the 
external world...The subjectivistic, egocentric interpretation of the world leads to 
solipsism, that is, the view that only one=s Self exists as a sovereign being...in the 
same way the primacy of national legal order means that only one=s own state can be 
conceived as being sovereign...With this in mind, we can describe the primacy of 
one=s own national legal order as state subjectivism, indeed as state solipsism.  The 
objectivistic world view starts from the reality of the external world in order to
conceive Self...but does not allow this Self to exist as a sovereign being...but only as 
an essential part of the world...in the same way the construction described as primacy 
of the international legal order starts from the external world of law, international 
law, as valid legal order, to conceive of the legal existence of individual states, but 
cannot afford to consider them as sovereign authorities C only as partial legal orders 
integrated into international law.100
In this Aobjectivistic@ scheme, the individual state is Abound by a majority decision of a 
collegiate organ@ of the international system as long as the Athis collegiate organ and its procedure 
has been created by a treaty concluded by the state@101 as well as by the decisions of international
tribunals which can declare norms of national law Aannulled for reasons of being >contrary to 
international law.=@102 However, as the younger Kelsen conceded C in an observation that goes far in 
explaining the visceral reactions to the American hyperpuissance C that for this project to work, it is
100 PTL, 344-345.
101 PTL, 343.
102 PTL, 342.
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Possibly exclusively through the aid of a legal hypothesis the aid of a legal 
hypothesis: that above the legal entities considered as states there is a legal system 
that delimits the spheres of validity of the individual states, preventing interference 
by one in the sphere of the other, or associating such interference with certain 
conditions that are equal for all.  That is, it is essential for there to be a legal system 
regulating, through norms equal for all, the reciprocal conduct between these entities 
and excluding at the root, as regards the legal relations between the individual states, 
any legal overvalue of one vis-à-vis the other...It is only on the basis of the primacy 
of the international law that the particular states appear on the same legal plane and 
can count legally as entities of equal rank, being subject equally to the higher 
international legal system.103
103 HANS KELSEN, Das Problem der Souveränität und die Theorie des Völkerrechts. Beitrag zu einer reinen 
Rechtslehre (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1920).
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And, as noted previously, what constitutes this international legal system is Aconsensus@-
driven, not only by an international Acommunity@ of theoretically equal sovereign nation-states,104
but also the Acommunity@ constituted of intergovernmental bodies like the United Nations and its 
related tribunals and agencies, the international non-governmental organizations who have associated 
104
 An interesting critique of the surrealism of this theoretical equality when confronted with geopolitical reality 
is found in MICHAEL J. GLENNON, AWhy the Security Council Failed,@ Foreign Affairs 82/3 (May-June 2003): 16-35.  
Glennon observed that: AThis year, the irrationality of treating states at equals was brought home as never before when it 
emerged that the will of the Security Council could be determined by Angola, Guinea, or Cameroon C nations whose 
representatives sat side by side and exercised an equal voice with those of Spain, Pakistan, and Germany.  The equality 
principle permitted any rotating council member to cast a de facto veto (by denying a majority the critical ninth vote 
necessary for potential victory).  Granting a de jure veto to the permanent five was, of course, the charter=s intended 
antidote to unbridled egalitarianism.  But it didn=t work: the de jure veto simultaneously undercorrected and 
overcorrected for the problem, lowering the United States to the level of France and raising France above India, which 
did not even hold a rotating seat on the council during the Iraq debate. Yet the de jure veto did nothing to dilute the 
rotating members= de facto veto.  The upshot was a Security Council that reflected the real world=s power structure with 
the accuracy of a fun-house mirror C and performed accordingly@ (33).
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with the globalist agenda of the world body,105 and the international class of bureaucrats who staff 
both sets of organizations.106
It is not that leading exponents of this international Acommunity@ act furtively or hide their 
ambitions.  In an essay commissioned for the UNDP Human Development Report 1994, Jan 
Tinbergen, winner of the first Nobel Prize for Economics in 1969, called for nothing less than a 
105
 These NGOs include not only the well-known advocacy groups, but also organizations whose issue is itself 
global governance.  A notable example is the self-styled ACommission on Global Governance,@ a organization made up of 
former United Nations officials and political leaders from a number of developed and developing countries that was 
endorsed by the UN Secretariat.  It has even published a detailed program for an expanded international system; see 
COMMISSION ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, Our Global Neighborhood: The Report of the Commission on Global 
Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
106
 On the bureaucracy of the UN and its subordinate institutions, see ROSEMARY RIGHTER, Utopia Lost: The 
United Nations and World Order (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995).  For a dated but, in retrospect, 
exceptionally prescient study, see DOUG BANDOW, Totalitarian Global Management: The UN=s War on the Liberal 
International Economic Order, Cato Policy Analysis 61 (Washington: Cato Institute, 1985).
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single world government:
Mankind=s problems can no longer be solved by national governments.  What is 
needed is World Government.
This can best be achieved by strengthening the United Nations system.  In some 
cases, this would mean changing the role of UN agencies from advice-giving to 
implementation.  Thus the FAO would become the World Ministry of Agriculture, 
UNIDO would become the World Ministry of Industry, and the ILO the World 
Ministry of Social Affairs.
In other cases, completely new institutions would be needed.  These could include, 
for example, a permanent World Police which would have the power to subpoena 
nations to appear before the International Court of Justice, or before specially created 
courts.  If nations do not abide by the Court=s judgement, it should be possible to 
apply sanctions, both non-military and military.107
107 UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, Human Development Report 1994 (New York/Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 88.
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It would hardly be fair to blame Hans Kelsen for the excesses of the United Nations and other 
international organizations that are increasingly ambitious in their quest for a system of global 
governance.  The late jurist was, after all, working within a theoretical framework at a time when the 
horrors of two world wars caused many to look for a new Kantian-inspired Astate of universal peace@
to be brought about by a benevolent world government.108  Kelsen himself thought of the ideas 
expounded in his Pure Theory as Aa theory of positive law in general, not of a specific legal 
order...not an interpretation of specific national or international legal norms.@109   He even cautioned 
that he offered a theory that described Awhat and how the law is, not how it ought to be.@110
However, in proposing a Apure theory of law@ that attempted to eliminate all considerations of ethics 
and political theory, Kelsen admittedly created a philosophy of law that was indifferent to these other 
considerations,111 thus leaving open the door to a course of evolution that his theory, even if it did 
not actively encourage it, had no instrument with which to judge, much less arrest.112  As Juvenal 
once asked: AQuis custodiet custodes?@
108
 See IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals, trans. Ted 
Humphrey (New York: Hackett, 1992).  The European adoption of this Kantian vision in contrast to the American 
retention of a Hobbesian worldview is the subject of fascinating thesis, originally raised in an essay published in Policy 
Review, expounded in a brief book: ROBERT KAGAN, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World 
Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003).  
109 PTL, 1.
110 PTL, 1.
111
 Cf. PTL, 345-347.
112
 On at least one occasion, however, Kelsen did throw methodological caution to the winds and ventured into 
advocacy; see KELSEN, Das Problem der Souveränität, 319: AIt is only temporarily, by no means forever, that 
contemporary humanity is divided into states, formed in any case in more or less arbitrary fashion. Its legal unity, that is 
the civitas maxima as organization of the world: this is the political core of the primacy of international law, which is at 
the same time the fundamental idea of that pacificism which, in the sphere of international politics, constitutes the 
inverted image of imperialism.@
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Not long after the attacks of September 11, Ambassador Richard N. Haass, director of the 
Office of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. State Department, defined the American 
administration=s policy as Ahardheaded multilateralism,@ explaining that:
We are willing to listen, learn, and modify policies when we hear compelling 
arguments.  But we will not go along simply to get along...By the same token, we do 
not take lightly the cost to ourselves and to others when we forgo participation in 
some multilateral initiative.  In the future, we will give consultations every chance to 
produce an acceptable compromise.  And if we conclude that agreement is beyond 
reach, we will explain why and do our best to put forward alternatives.113
113 RICHARD N. HAASS, AAmerican Foreign Policy After September 11th,@ Remarks to the World Affairs Council 
of Northern California (November 16, 2001) at: www.state.gov/s/p/rem/index.cfm?docid=6310.  
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In this regard, a Adecent respect for the opinions of mankind,@ to borrow the felicitous phrase 
of the Founding Fathers, will require an effort to recognize and understand C regardless of whehter 
one agrees with it or not C Kelsen=s philosophy of law and its significance as the legal ideology that 
motivates the insistence of international organizations, like the United Nations, as well as other 
countries on Aconsensus@ and their drive for a system of global governance.  While the former 
insistence is frustrating and the latter ambition may seem far-fetched and beyond the horizons of 
today=s political landscape, it nonetheless behooves one to keep in mind the warning of philosopher 
Richard Weaver that Aideas have consequence.@114 And in a dynamic geopolitical continuum, the 
forgotten theories of yesterday are all-too-often the hidden perils of today and the real challenges of 
tomorrow.
114
 See RICHARD M. WEAVER, Ideas have Consequences (1948; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).
